Case technology 2: Bio-security and bio-safety

Biosecurity and dual use problematics in pandemics research:

On 14 June 2006 the newspaper The Guardian published an article by one of its journalists.

He describes how he “arranged for a tiny fragment of the smallpox genome to be synthesized bu a mail-order biological-supplies company and delivered to his home address”. This was just one of several incidents that highlight the inherent dual use problematic of biotechnology, and in particular synthetic biology. Fears of proper biosafety standards have accompanied the researchers in the field all along.

Bio-safety vs bio-security

Duncan (2004) describes her research of getting probes of some victims of the 1918 “Spanish flu”, contained in the permafrost of Svalbard / Norway. While the meticulous planning of the research took her several years, due to the effort to devise satisfactory biosafety protocols and getting permissions from the Norwegian authorities, another competing group took similar samples from Alaskan victims quickly without caring about biosafety or permissions. While researchers in synthetic biology are reported to be actively engaged in discussions about biosafety, some people express worries that the more serious issues of biosecurity,especially the possible misuses for biowarfare or bioterrorism are neglected.

Created viruses

There are also reported incidents where flu genes created in a lab apparently have found their way to infected pigs in South Korea, an incident that raises worries about the weaknesses in our global security system for such research.

The well-publicized Anthrax mail attack in the USA in the late 2001 is believed also to have its sources from a research lab.

In 2001 an Australian team accidentally created a deadly version of mousepox, a virus that is related to smallpox, by removing a single gene, and in 2002 it was reported how a research team had synthesized a polio gene from scratch.

Dual use problematics have also entered scientific publishing. Lawrence Weinberg and Yifan Liu published an article in 2005 where they developed a model of how the milk supply chain from cows to consumer can be vulnerable to a deliberate release of botulinum toxin.

The question of bioterrorist

The question was raised whether research of this kind should be published in the public domain at all, since it might be used as a recipe for bioterrorists.

However, the risks of newly emerging pandemics are real. Indeed, scientists work on the assumption that lethal global flu epidemics occur three to four times during a century, which indicates that a new pandemic might be on the doorstep.

The focus is on the H5N1 strain of the avian flu as the suspected next culprit. Work on these will often require high security laboratories (level 4), but local publics are rallying against the building of such laboratories. Giving them the status of classified laboratories does not generally raise the trust that responsible work is being performed there, neither locally, nor internationally.

Preparing for a new pandemic would however require intensified research, in particular in regard to developing effective vaccines, since existing vaccines such as Tamiflu are reported to be only partially effective and even suspected of serious side effects if used in large populations.

New initiatives like GISAID (Global Initiative on Sharing Avian Influenza Data) in 2006 have gone a long way in securing openness in sharing avian flu samples and data, which should end the secrecy of some researchers for competitive reasons. However, implementation may still suffer from lack of funds and technical support in those countries where the need is the greatest. Also, greater openness in regard to sample and data sharing may also increase the dual use risks of bioterrorism.

Ethical codes of conduct or law?

Confronting the challenges of biosecurity, most biologists tend to oppose strict international control mechanisms or regulations. They feel that much of their science is already overregulated, and this assumedly affects their research negatively. International organizations such as the WHO are ready to impose strict biosafety regulations but stop short of extending them to biosecurity issues.

National interests of states assumedly also work against the adoption of strict regulations, in fear that they might hamper their own biosecurity research or reveal weaknesses of it to other states.

Scientists look therefore at voluntary codes of conduct as the solution to the problem. However, to date no international agreed code of conduct for this field has been adopted. It is also an open question whether ethical codes of conduct, i.e. soft law, both has enough bite to change lax practices in the handling of potentially dangerous biological material and has the power to convince a skeptical public that all is indeed well.

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