

**EC Project:
The Landscape and Isobars of European Values in
Relation to Science and New Technology
(ValueIsobars)**

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Work package 1

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Introduction

Values and science and technology

Scientific and technological innovations affect the values Europeans hold and share. On the one hand, there are fears that innovations could endanger values such as autonomy or privacy, while on the other hand there are hopes that science and technologies would contribute to realise values such as security or health. A report by the Science Policy Research Group (2004) concluded that social values can be seen as central drivers for citizen's attitudes to science and technology (hereafter: S&T). What Europeans hope or fear from S&T but also how they perceive scientific and technological innovations depend on their values.

As social values play an important role in people's view of S&T, European policy-makers, e.g. the European Commission, consider it necessary to bring S&T policies more in line with the values of European citizens in order to increase public acceptance of policy decisions. The speed of research innovations poses further challenges to governance. As new technologies are rapidly evolving, European research policies must address ethical issues in S&T at the outset, rather than at the stage of full-blown technologies or marketable products.

Any attempt to bring governance more in line with social or European values has to face some difficult questions. What are values, what are social and/or (more precisely) European values? The values Europeans hold in everyday life? Values deduced from European historiography or from philosophical considerations? Or the values referred to in European treaties ratified by all European Union member states? Another challenge concerns the concept of values itself. Although values are seen as central drivers for people's attitudes to S&T, the basic concepts of values and the significance of these different concepts for a better, more accepted research policy are still not completely understood. What exactly are values? How do they become effective? How do social values relate to philosophical or other values? What can we do in the case of conflicting values? Are there values which are mutually exclusive? How can values be assessed or measured? How can values be translated into rules and laws?

The project Value Isobars

These are some of the questions the project *Value Isobars* deals with. Its goal is to contribute to a good governance of S&T by providing blueprints for a value-based and value-informed new and flexible governance of science-society relation in Europe. The project as a whole identifies necessary research tasks in order to move from a generic understanding of value-based and value-informed governance to more specific mechanisms of governance that improve current practice. Emerging biotechnologies with dual use problematic and security technologies (biometrics) serve as pilots to test the validity of the framework. The project's key research challenges are (1) understanding the very concept(s) of values, (2) improving the methodology for the study of values, (3) identifying innovative mechanisms of platforms for value-based dialogue in civil society and citizen consultation, and (4) assessing the potential of legal and regulatory instruments.

Work package 1: Value Concepts

As one of the project partners, the International Centre for Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities (Eberhard Karls Universität Tübingen, EKUT-IZEW) works on the question of value concepts. The work package (WP) 1 explores and reviews conceptual issues concerning the notion of values in general and with regard to the field of S&T. It is based on extensive literature reviews both of scholarly literature and of public documents (governments, NGOs etc.) dealing with values in and for S&T. The work will assimilate and summarise important

developments and theorising within such diverse fields as philosophy, law, sociology, theology, economics and psychology. The historical roots and major contributions towards theories of values shall be explored and analysed in comparison and with an additional focus on the notion of ‘European’ values. The diverse approaches will be contrasted and analysed in regard to problematic presuppositions and constraints with a focus on values *in, of* and *with regard to* S&T, among others taking into account ethical vs. political/policy theories with regard to the governance of S&T and values.

The question will be asked how these theories relate to a general understanding of human action and attitude. In particular, the analytic differences between values on the one hand and rules (norms, institutions, and principles), propositional attitudes (preferences, wishes, desires) and virtues on the other hand will be a focus of attention. Questions of what distinguishes moral values from other values such as social, theoretical or aesthetical values, and how this relates to ethical theory and practical ethics will be pursued. An overview of value concepts and the main parameters of interaction shall be provided. The possible interaction of values with emerging, more permanent attitudes, in regard to governance of S&T, will be explored. A preliminary, policy-oriented generic framework for a unified and comprehensive theory is the overall goal of this work package. It shall comprise the overview of value concepts, of parameters and their interdependence, an identification of main field of value-conflicts and of shared values with regard to S&T and ideas of (a) understanding, (b) communicating, and (c) handling these “landscapes” of values.

Current status of WP1

So far, WP1 reviewed the relevant philosophical, sociological and some of the theological literature on the concept of values. The aim was to understand the very concept which gained a central role in philosophy in the years between 1850 and 1930. At that time, some philosophers claimed that philosophy was only conceivable as a philosophy of values. In recent years, values seem to have re-entered a focus of attention.

The review of the literature on values laid the foundation for approaching the following research tasks. First, the term ‘value’ had to be told from other terms which in everyday language but also in academic parlance are used in the same context, sometimes even synonymously but which nevertheless have to be distinguished sharply. Here, three groups of terms had been identified: *rules* (norms, institutions, principles), *propositional attitudes* (interests, desires, preferences) and *virtues*. Second, it was necessary to find an understanding of values that would enable to deal with and to investigate the question of European values. For instance, value concepts claiming eternal values that exist independently of time and space would pose problems because from this perspective the analytic focus on European values would just not make any sense. Third, it was necessary to address the distinction between philosophical values and other types of values, such as theoretical or aesthetical values, but especially social values. As social values are seen as central drivers for people’s attitudes to S&T, clarification on how social values relate to philosophical values is of vital interest *Value Isobars*. Finally, knowing what values are allows dealing with the puzzle what to do in the case of conflicting values.

WP1 suggests an understanding of values that allows for i) satisfying philosophical demands, ii) meeting non-academic common usages of the term and iii) investigating European values. This not only made it possible to distinguish the term value from other related terms but also to classify the different types of values. The important distinction of philosophical and social values was achieved.

Besides focussing on terminological questions, the work package also tentatively suggested solutions to the matter of value landscapes and the role of values in governance generally. In this respect, it articulated the working hypothesis that in EC and its S&T governance the shift

to concepts of values is accompanied by a side-lining of ethics, the latter understood as an endeavour which aims at normative statements of acceptable and unacceptable actions with regard to S&T. In short: reference to values seems to open possibilities whereas ethics is (wrongly) understood as closing and/or prohibiting. Evidence for this hypothesis could be found in both the academic literature on values and on governance.

In accordance with the description of work, WP1 reviewed the academic literature on values. For pragmatic reasons, it already addressed the conceptual analysis of values, norms, preferences and attitudes which would have been due in the following deliverable. The work so far mainly focussed on philosophical and conceptual issues as well as inter- and transdisciplinary aspects of values. Future tasks will be the question of value conflicts and value trade-offs and the debates on values in S&T policy in the European realm.

The Landscape and Isobars of European Values in S&T

In 1668/9, the Dutch painter Jan Vermeer (1632-1675) created the painting “The Geographer”. In many ways, this picture raises several questions that are also central for the work of *Value Isobars*.



The picture focuses on an individual scientist, the geographer. He represents a science that was rediscovered in early 17th century Europe and increasingly gained importance. That time can be seen as the beginning of modern Geography. The geographer's facial features are those of Antonie van Leeuwenhoek (1632-1723) who is considered to be the 'Father of Microbiology'. What is displayed in the painting is therefore the new relevance of science in society. The 17th century also witnessed other scientific discoveries and inventions that are associated with the names of Galilei, Kepler, Newton, or Descartes.

On the wall, in the background of the painting, there is a chart that depicts all sea coasts of Europe. These decades not only saw the rise of the modern sciences but also the beginning of

overseas trade and colonialism. Both developments influenced each other. As new maps were required for navigation, this advanced cartography and geography, while new discoveries contributed to improve maps.

Apart from the obvious fact that *Value Isobars* aims at developing a map of a European value landscape, this painting raises many other crucial aspects of sciences and technology *Value Isobars* deals with. A concluding chapter will come back to that. In the following, the current project results will be presented. Departing from official EU communications (3), it will be demonstrated that the concept of values is a very complex one. The next chapter (4) of this paper addresses conceptual and terminological questions of what values are. This is followed by an introduction into a possible mapping of value landscape (5). Finally, the broad issue of social values will be dealt with (6): what are social values? What are European values? What is the relation between values and governance?

European Values

In 2009, the President of the European Commission Manuel Jose Barroso stated that the Commission

[...] has faced some of the most challenging times the European Union has ever experienced, at a time of huge economic and social change. Our record shows that we have held fast to the core values and core goals that have made the Union so successful, and will leave a powerful contribution to the future development of the European project. I am particularly proud of our response to the economic and financial crisis, our ambitious agenda to fight climate change and the creation of a real European energy policy. The European Union is now taking the lead in shaping globalisation with European values and in promoting the European interest worldwide (European Commission 2009a).

The European Union was told to have been able, on the basis of certain values, to withstand successfully a whole range of major challenges. In the Commission's self-perception, it steered the EU through stormy times by imperturbably using core values as landmarks. Even more, it tries to influence the general weather situation (globalisation) with European values. Apparently, values not only allow orientation, but also enable action. Interestingly, even in the face of social change, when one would expect value change, the Commission seemed able to hold on to these values.

At this point, one can raise several questions. Values influence the action and the course of action of individuals, government and communities – but how do they do that? Are there values that endure even if society changes? What are these European values? How do they differ from and relate to non-European ones? These are serious questions, as European values are meant to shape a process that affects individuals and states on a global scale.

At the 10th South East Europe Cooperation Process Meeting in Zagreb in 2007, President Barroso spoke to the representatives of states that do not belong to the EU such as Turkey, Croatia, or Albania:

This year we celebrate the 50th anniversary of the European Union. We are proud of this achievement, which has brought peace, prosperity and solidarity to a continent wracked by war. [...] we reaffirmed our shared values, like freedom, democracy, the rule of law, tolerance and mutual respect. We made clear our determination to preserve these values and use them to shape our fast-changing world, by continuing to work closely together. Those values formed the very foundations of the European Union. They remain at the core of our activities today. Successive waves of enlargement mean that millions more benefit from these values, who previously languished under the dead hand of dictatorship. You, the countries of the Balkans, have made difficult and often courageous decisions to help those values take root here. You can rest assured that the European Union will always be at your side to assist you in this endeavour. But the desire to continue consolidating those values must be yours. No-one can impose them from outside, and certainly not the EU (Barroso 2007).

Again, Barroso refers to community values and to the guiding function of these values in difficult times. On behalf of an important political institution, he emphasises the commitment

to these values and their importance for political action. Political action guided by values would already benefit the people of the EU accession states. But what about their value commitment? Accession of a state to a community of values does not entail that its citizens also share those values. Barroso hints that also individual people have to commit themselves and he seems to believe that good political institutions play their part. This aspect aims directly at the crucial questions of what values are and where they come from. To return to the matter of European values, if they are basically open to be shared by all people the question arises how exclusively European are they in the end.

The last aspect refers to a conceptual problem. Barroso lists some European values: freedom, democracy, the rule of law, tolerance and mutual respect. On other occasions, he also mentioned democracy and peace (Barroso 2009a, 2008, 2007). This however raises the question, what values actually are: democracy is an institution or a state order, the rule of law can be considered as a constitutional principle or a procedure, freedom is an ideal, and mutual respect can also be described as a virtue. Can they all be values?

This does not want to suggest that the European Commission holds an under-complex view of values; on the contrary: the concept of value is in fact a very complex one and in political, social and other common usage it has many different facets. For the current project, it is therefore necessary that some conceptual groundwork is laid on the different notions of value.

Value Concepts

The following chapter first goes into value ethical considerations (4.1). It gives a short introduction into the term's history and subsequently displays dimensions of value concepts eventually employed by moral philosophy. It then addresses terminological considerations (4.2). In everyday parlance, the term 'value' is used synonymous with or in the context of other terms such as norms, principles, desires, or virtues. The discussion of these terms helps to sharpen the meaning of the concept of 'value' but at the same time emphasises the connections to related terms that are of importance for further discussions in the project. In a first step, we can assign these terms to three different groups: rules (norms, institutions, and principles), propositional attitudes (desire, interests, and preferences) and virtues.

Value ethical concepts

History of the concept of value

The academic literature appears rather unanimous in that the term 'value' is a comparatively new scholarly term (cf. especially Joas 2000, pp. 20/21; Kuhn 1975; Schnädelbach 1983). In the 1840s, the term 'value' migrated from economy into philosophy and later into the social sciences. The contemporary meaning of 'value' does not result from everyday speech but from discussions in 19th century German philosophy. The key figure in this development was Hermann Lotze (1817-1881) to whom the different strands of value theories (neo-Kantian, phenomenological and philosophy of life) can be traced back. The reception of Kant's works played an important part. In his critique of Utilitarianism, Kant spoke of the "absolute value" of rational beings that are ends in themselves and that cannot be evaluated according to other aims. His usage of value however did not influence the emergence of the term 'value', but was rediscovered retrospectively. The term gained its ultimate popularity, however, especially because of Friedrich Nietzsche's works (1844-1900). With his phrase "revaluation of all values", he contributed to the popularisation of the term 'value'. Nietzsche can also be regarded as the inventor of the question where our values come from (Joas 2000).

In the mid-19th century, German philosophy turned, on the one hand, against Kant "who denied the moral world all empirical character and derealized the phenomenal world" and against Hegel, on the other hand, "who subjected the moral world to the dictates of the logic

of the historical process” (Joas 2000, p. 21). The concept of value substituted the ‘Good’, which before had a long philosophical standing. According to traditional philosophy, it was possible to ascertain this ‘Good’ in the real world by rational contemplation or divine revelation. It existed in and was part of the real world. Scholasticism spoke of “*ens et bonum convertuntur*” („Being and good are interchangeable”). From this point of view, it was useless to ask where the ‘Good’ came from as it was there in the empirical world. One could ask how to perceive it (contemplation, revelation) but one would not ask for its origins. The ‘Good’ had an objective existence. In the mid-19th century, the metaphysical unity between the ‘Good’ and the real world dissolved. This process resulted in a turn to *subjectivity* as moral judgements now depended on individual’s practical reason. At the same time, many philosophers (while acknowledging that dissolution of the ‘Good’ and the real world) thought that the ‘Good’ might be found in the future, at the end of a historical process. The most prominent and influential of these schools of thought is Marxism (in addition to a multifaceted critique of values as an economic term). It was Nietzsche’s lasting contribution to the debate on values to dismantle the teleological perspective and to demonstrate the *contingency* of values. The emergence of specific values is not necessary and can therefore not be expected.

Value ethical approaches


Value ethics reacted to this loss of orientation. When the metaphysical unity between the ‘Good’ and the real world broke, the real world was reduced to mere facts that could not any longer provide orientation. Lotze realised that the sciences could not give orientative knowledge as they only dealt with the empirical world (Fischer et al. 2007, p. 395). In this context, the concept of values was seen as the answer to that crisis of orientation. The result was a philosophical dualism between *facticity* and *validity* – the world of facts and the world of values.

In contrast to the older notion of the ‘Good’, that had an objective existence in the real world, values and evaluations only had a subjective connotation. Therefore, its proponents were interested in questions of how to come from subjective feelings/notions of values to evaluations that claim objectivity or in the relationship between feeling and evaluating values and statements on facts. Predominantly they tackled the problems of subjectivity and contingency of values.

In the following, the two main value ethical approaches will be presented: the *Formal Value Ethics* mainly represented by the Neo-Kantians philosophers of the Southwest German School (Wilhelm Windelband, Heinrich Rickert, Ernst Troeltsch) and the *Material Value Ethics* whose main representatives were Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann. For the purposes of the project *Value Isobars*, it is not necessary to dive deep into the respective schools. However, what concerns the project directly is the question how they conceptualised values and what these conceptions mean for the understanding of values in *Value Isobars*.

Chart 1 gives an overview over the different dimensions of the two value concepts. It demonstrates opposite positions in their debate on values. The conceptual pairs are Being (‘Sein’) and Validity (‘Geltung’), intellectual and intuitive, real and ideal and subjective and objective.

Chart 1: Dimensions of value concepts (translated by the authors)



Schnädelbach 1983, p. 206

The distinction between ‘Being’ and ‘Validity’ is a result of the gap between values and reality. It has been mentioned before, that the ‘Good’ existed in the real world. It had an objectivity which values on the contrary did not have. While the real world empirically exists, the status of values became unclear. Are they only valid as was claimed by formal value ethics? Or do they somehow really exist as was said by material value ethics? This is reflected in the distinction between ‘Being’ and ‘Validity’. Both have different modes. The sphere of ‘Being’ has the mode of *facticity*. It consists of what actually exists (empirical world). In this sphere, we distinguish between either existing or non-existing. Factual things exist or they do not exist. The sphere of values, on the contrary, has the mode of *validity*. It allows for orientation and evaluates the existing world. In this sphere, we not only distinguish between existing and not existing but also between valid and invalid. We can state that a value exists or does not exist, but we can furthermore evaluate whether a value is valid or not.

The pair *intellectual – intuitive* refers to the way values are realised or recognised. Do we realise values by means of intellectual reflection on a value’s validity (‘Wertreflexion’). Or do we feel or sense values intuitively (‘Wertschau’)?

Value realism claims that values exist in reality; they are part of an empirical psychophysical world of senses. *Value idealism*, on the other hand, locates values in an ideal (unreal) world; they appear only in a conscious mind. This also affects the ontological status of values. A value realist remains in a psychophysical monism. Values exist as, at least in principle accessible by empirical sciences, mental states of a conscious organism. Values are real and qualities of things. We just have to sense these qualities. A value idealist postulates a dualism of a real and an ideal being which both have different characteristics. The real being exists and is perceptible by the senses. The ideal world is valid and can only be understood in contrast to a scientific explanation which is infeasible here.

The difference *subjective-objective* asks whether real or ideal values exist independently of a conscious mind that grasps values. According to a value relativist values depend on a historically and culturally contingent subject, while a value objectivist attributes validity to them independent of the conditions of their emergence. However, it should be stressed that one should not confound the pairs of real-ideal and of subjective-objective. We could experience that ideas that are part of our consciousness exist independently of our consciousness. According to Schnädelbach (1983, p. 205), objective value idealism is as imaginable as a subjective value realism that would claim that values really exist but their nature and intensity depends on a validating (valuing) subject.

However one conceptualises values, when it comes to exemplifying values, they are often referred to as general things such as democracy, welfare, wealth or family. Values understood as concrete or abstract things have been described as *value objects*. From them we can distinguish *object values*, which are qualities that make objects valuable (e.g. beauty or truth). *Person values* such as tolerance, discipline or solidarity are a subcategory as they qualify people. They are valuable and therefore estimable attitudes which can also be understood as virtues of a person (Schnädelbach 2001-2, pp. 150-1).

In all these sub-definitions, values are understood as nouns or nominalisations. Schnädelbach calls them *pseudo-things* (2001-2, p. 160) and ironically describes them as “light bulbs in the platonic sky of ideas” (Schnädelbach 2006): After the sun which represented the ‘Good’ in metaphysical philosophy went out, it was replaced by values that like light bulbs could be screwed into the sky to give (moral) orientation. In the scientific literature, this nominal use has been criticised – although it is acknowledged that nominalisation is to a certain degree unavoidable, because it is a result of how Indo-European languages work (Schnädelbach 2008). Mandry (2009, pp. 168-176) summarises the critique of the nominal use of values as follows: First, there is the problem of pseudo-objectivity. This aspect refers to the question of subjectivity because grammatically, values and validity remind of the subjective nature of values: something is valid *for someone*. In evaluations, values are the reference points with the help of which individuals assess actions as good, bad, coward, brave etc. This connection gets blurred by the nominal use of values. Nominalisation suggests objectivity and therefore an obligatory nature of value that is, however, both inappropriate and not justified. Second, values are in constant danger of becoming ideology when insisted upon dogmatically. This criticism goes back to Carl Schmitt (Schmitt, Jüngel, Schelz 1979, p. 33) According to him, those who claim the validity of a value have to make them valid and to enforce them – in the end by every means as he demonstrated using the example of the French Revolution. One does not have to support Schmitt’s view to agree that speaking about values have to be argumentative and open with regard to implicit normativities and underlying evaluations. The issue of reinforcing values or their respective violations remains.

We have seen that both value ethical approaches, material and formal value ethics, tried to cope with the problems of subjectivity and contingency. While they accepted the “shift towards subjectivity” (Joas 2000, p. 20-23), they aimed at averting the, as it seems for some of its proponents, menacing insight in the “historical contingency of values”:

Neo-Kantian philosophers of value [... believed] that the only thing that could prevent the fall into bottomless value relativism was their project of a philosophy of values and their conception of philosophy in general as theory of validation. For them [...] the ideal realm of valid values could not originate in human action or experience; rather, this realm belonged to another mode of being and, for this reason, subjects could only embody and discover values, not produce them (Joas 2000, p. 22).

If we hence ask for the genesis of European values, approaches that would still repel the idea of contingency are neither convincing nor useful. We want to point out here, however, that also historically contingent values and norms can be employed as valid and binding – not for eternity but for a certain given time or at least for certain societies, states and/or supranational institutions.

Mandry (2009) and Schnädelbach (2001-2) suggest that we better understand values as attributes, as reference points of evaluations. Evaluations relate to values in a way that they are referred to as criteria, ideals and moral standards that are detached and articulated independently from single evaluations (Mandry 2009, pp. 162-164). While the detachment from single evaluations and the conversion to nouns allow for disambiguation and abstraction, the generality of values results in a relative distance from experience and content-related vagueness. These abstracted values can travel to different contexts. However, they can also

become contested because we do not always know what they mean in specific situations. It is the task of value discourses to clarify these situations.

Taking values as reference points of evaluation can further contribute to the understanding of orientating values. Regarding everything that gives orientation as a value might again lead to confusion. As principles, norms, virtues etc. could give orientation, they all might be considered as values. Therefore, it is suggested to use *values as reference points for evaluations*. Being objects or criteria of evaluations, they give orientation. With this in mind, we can understand, for example, how democracy can be a value and an institution at the same time. The value 'democracy' contains specific normative ideas (such as popular sovereignty, human rights, rule of law etc.) which we use to evaluate certain state orders, laws etc. as being democratic or undemocratic. At the same time, there are several possible institutional configurations of democracies that are mere set of rules that can vary locally and historically.

Values – first results for Value Isobars

Two aspects of values are of importance as the outcome of our analysis: the subjectivity and contingency of values and their problematic nominal use. It was, thirdly, pointed out that approaches claiming an eternal existence of values independent of time and space are not apt for *Value Isobars* that has to deal with European social values.

Based on philosophical and historical literature, it was therefore suggested that we regard values as the reference points of evaluations. They serve as criteria for evaluations of what we find good or bad, brave or coward etc. In nominalisations, however, these evaluations become condensed which allows the noun to travel from the context of evaluation to other contexts but at the expense of conceptual meaning.

Value terminology

Values and rules

A **norm** is a more or less generalised instruction with respect to expected behaviour of defined groups of social actors or the expected performance of a specific activity (Ott 2006, p. 474, Streeck/ Thelen 2005, p. 9). A norm can be justified by values or high substantial principles such as justice or human rights. Typically, a norm is a rule that can be analysed with regard to its components (Ott 2006, pp. 475-80). They can be classified as technical, epistemic, conventional, legal and moral norms (*type of norm*) that in everyday life are found in the form of technological standards, customs, laws, and commandments. The *character* refers to the content of a norm which arises from the combination of behavioural modes with a so called *deontic operator*. The deontic operator is based on moral basic modalities: allow, forbid, have a right, ought to. Norms are directed to different social groups (*addressees*): Who is supposed to follow the rule (moral agents)? Who are the people affected by the instructed action (moral patients)? Some strict moral commitments are universally binding for all members of a community (moral community). Norms can refer to specific social roles (physicians, lawyers etc.), goods (nature, security) or contexts (sport, politics etc.) (*specification of a norm*). Usually, it also specifies *exception clauses*, *sanctions* and an *authority* to enforce a norm.

An **institution** can be understood as a complex set of rules that focus on a specific social issue (Streeck/ Thelen 2005). According to Hall (1986, p. 19), they are „the formal rules, compliance procedures, and standard operating practices that structure the relationship between individuals in various units of the polity and economy“. We can further distinguish between informal institutions such as families or manners and formal institutions such as democracy, an organisation or any policy.

A **principle** can be understood as a high substantial norm or a formal perspective to evaluate the validity of other norms. We can distinguish between content-related principles such as the *Reverence for Life* (Albert Schweitzer) or principles of justice or formal principles such as the Golden Rule or the *Categorical Imperative* (Immanuel Kant). A principle can be justified by demonstrating that under certain conditions (e.g. *Veil of Ignorance*, John Rawls) it is rational to choose this principle (Ott 1998, p. 348).

Norms, institutions, and principles are rules of the morally and legally right behaviour. There are different possibilities of how specific or universal these rules can be formulated, interpreted and applied (Düwell, Hübenthal, Werner 2006, p. 15; Ott 1998, p. 348). *Norms* are directly aimed to regulate action; they are more or less context specific and can specify affected groups of people. Values on the contrary are too general and they lack the specific deontic operator to regulate behaviour immediately and effectively. Values need, and are linked to, social norms for a situational application. This means conversely that norms in one way or the other are always based on values (Schäfers 2008, p. 37; Schnädelbach 1983, p. 201).

According to Joas (2005, pp. 14/15), norms are restrictive, while values are attractive. Norms exclude objectives and/or means of action as morally or legally unacceptable. Values, however, do not limit a range of action but make action possible in the first place. They give us an impression of what we want. Joas' distinction is useful because it illustrates very well the different action-guiding qualities of values and norms: norms regulate, while values motivate. However, norms do not solely exclude action. As we have seen, there are different deontic operators and forbidding is only one of the moral basic modalities. 'Allowing', 'having a right' and 'ought to' are others. If we follow that line of argumentation, we might face a dilemma because we might find that both norms and values enable action. If a norm allows action, how does it differ from an enabling value? A norm tells what to do in a specific context. By knowing how to act in a specific situation, we are enabled for action. A value, however, does not tell us what to do in a specific situation. It makes action possible by providing orientation and motivation for action, though without saying what to do in specific contexts. With regard to values, it is nevertheless useful to view them as something that attracts us. What distinguishes them from norms is that they are not context-specific and do not have a deontic operator.

Like norms, *institutions* are meant to regulate human behaviour by allowing or restricting it. It is important to highlight that neither norms in general nor institutions in particular can work effectively when their specific social value was not made binding in the socialisation process (Schäfers 2008, p. 37). *Principles* are a specific category of norms, usually very high-ranking or the highest. It shall be noted, however, that especially in the field of application-oriented English speaking ethics, all sorts of rules are also called "principles". Both notions of principles become important when we speak of value trade-offs.

Values and virtues

Schnädelbach (2001-02, p. 151) points to the fact that very often discipline, tolerance, respect or helpfulness are considered to be values, while strictly speaking they are virtues. Very generally speaking, virtues are positive, desirable character traits. According to Wils (2006, p. 534), virtues are the attitudes of a moral agent that enables him to act freely, appropriately and pertinaciously according to his moral convictions. Mieth (2007, p. 24) accentuates human action when he defines virtue as the attitude to values as moral criteria that is expressed in action. Therefore, virtues can be seen as a link between values and action. We do not only need an understanding of what is morally good or right but also an attitude to act accordingly. This attitude can be seen as something valuable in itself – hence a genuine moral trait. Some

value ethical approaches viewed these character traits as person values (Mieth 2007; Schnädelbach 2001-02, p. 151).

Values and propositional attitudes

If values are attractive and give us an idea of what we want, are they not just a more lasting, stable and superior version of our **desires**? Joas (2005, p. 15) rejects that view by referring to John Dewey who distinguishes between *desired* and *desirable*. Desires are only facts; they contain what individuals actually desire. Contrary to this, values express ideas of what is worth desiring. Values allow for evaluating desires. But they are more. Values are not simply rational ideas of what is desirable; ideas that can easily be abandoned due to objections. They also have a very strong emotional element (on Dewey's theory of value, cf. Joas 2000, pp. 107-109). Joas (2005, p. 15) defines values as *emotionally connoted conceptions of the desirable*. If we witness the violation of a value, we do not simply state this violation soberly, but we are outraged or ashamed.

An **interest** ("Interesse" in German) can be understood as any form of concern that is directed to an object, action or opposite creature. Interest has, among other things, been used as synonymous with the value that a good has for a person. It also includes the pursuit of this good (Schmücker 2003, p. 308; Mieth 2007, p. 23). There is a subjective understanding of interest that views interests as what everybody considers necessary for his or her happiness. It is therefore not possible to determine objective interests. However, there is also a social side to the meaning of interest. Persons, understood as individuals that balance benefits and losses according to their internal preference lists, have to satisfy their interests in interaction with other individuals. Resulting conflicts have to be regulated by morals and law.

Desires and interests are both related to values but should not be confused. While it has been mentioned that values and desires are not on the same analytic level because we use values to evaluate desires, the same is true for interests. This has caused great problems for partisans of Utilitarianism, namely to explain where our preferences come from. More normativist-orientated social scientists have been more relaxed on this issue, as they focussed explicitly on values and their importance for human action and distinguished clearly between values, norms and preferences. They faced different problems though, especially because they could not explain how individuals act according to values. Normativist-orientated approaches regard values as cognitive scripts and moral templates that were internalised in socialisation processes and that become taken-for-granted and therefore invisible. It remains unclear how we refer to them actively and reactively when faced with new situations (Joas 2000, pp.12-19; Joas 2005, Hall/Taylor 1996, pp. 946-950).

There is still another side to values that distinguishes them from interests. According to Joas, values have a passive element. We do not simply change our values because of preachments or rational objections. The commitment to a value is not just external, distant or experimental. It is not a question of choice or decision as in the case of interests, we feel bound by values by some mixture of implicit and explicit, personal and social influences. Our binding to values originates in experiences we made that something is good or bad. In this way, we are deeply moved by a value. Joas (2008) compares this to being in love. In the same way as people can not actively fall in love, they can not actively bind themselves to values. The binding to values emerges in an experience-based process and not as a result of calculation or preachment.

In this context, Joas (2005, pp. 13-15) speaks of a seeming paradox that is constitutive for our relation to values. Feeling bound to our values does not give us the impression of a restricted freedom. It is the other way round. Acting according to the values we feel bound to makes us feel free because we act in accordance to our self-image. Joas illustrates this observation with the example of Martin Luther who at the Reichstag in Worms in 1521 refused to renounce his

thesis which led to reformation. According to legend, Luther is said to have spoken the words: “Here I stand; I can do no other. God help me. Amen.” Of course, he could have done something else. Actually, he was forced to do something else, to renounce his thesis. However, as Luther felt bound to his values he was not able to do what he was asked (and externally forced) to.

Values – second results for Value Isobars

The comparison of different concepts from the perspective of descriptive ethics or moral sociology has contributed to a first understanding of the concept of value. Values enable action without demanding a specific (course of) action (Bockrath 1998, p. 380). They attract us and motivate our action. A value is not a rule in the sense of a practical, context-sensitive instruction that specifies situations, actions, agents, nor does it include deontic operators. The gap between value and action can be and has to be bridged by norms or virtues.

Values also have to be distinguished from desires, preferences and interests. As they are located on different analytic levels, they cannot be used synonymously. On the basis of values, we evaluate desires, preferences or interests. Furthermore, our binding to values is different from that to interests because it has a passive element. We feel bound to our values. This binding originates in experiences we made. To sum up, values *motivate* our actions, they *give orientation*, they are *reference points of our evaluations* and we *feel bound to them rationally and emotionally*.

These findings are related to both ideas of internal processes enabling values to operate as well to the external metaphor of (values) landscapes.

Value landscape

WP1 aims to contribute to explore the possibilities of mapping of European values. Philosophically, an interesting and promising approach would be Charles Taylor’s idea of a moral map (Taylor 1985). Taylor uses a spatial metaphor to illustrate how people relate to their values. The idea of moral landscapes is part of his value theory which builds on Harry Frankfurt’s distinction between first- and second-order desires. In Philosophy and Ethics, this distinction contributes to the debate on human personality and how it can be discerned from other creatures such as other animals. Like the latter, humans have spontaneous desires (first-order desires) but in addition they also have desires (second-order desires) that order and evaluate the spontaneous desires. For instance, we can have the desire to have or not have a specific desire, to follow it or abstain. Ernst Tugendhat (2007) distinguishes between sensual desires (first-order desires) and rational ones (second-order desires) that are reflective desires. In *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* [1690], John Locke speaks of the power to suspend the prosecution of a desire in order to make way for consideration on that desire (Chapter 21, §48). It is this ability to reflective self-evaluation that characterises humans.

Taylor distinguishes between two types of considerations: weak and strong evaluations. They give an answer to the question whether we choose to evaluate our desires on the basis of contingent or categorical reasons (Joas 2000, p. 128). In case of weak evaluations, we reflect how to realise our first-order desires best or most efficiently while in the case of strong evaluations, we ask for the motivation why we satisfy or reject a desire. We articulate strong evaluations in terms of oppositions such as important and unimportant, higher or lower, brave or coward, noble or common. These pairs constitute a moral space, a net of corresponding situational perceptions, courses of action, emotions and self-conceptions (Rosa 1996, p. 112-4). In it, people find orientation with the help of a moral map located on which are our individual value convictions.

Rosa (1996, 114) correctly propounds that we do not only need an intact map but also the ability to locate ourselves in it. This location takes the shape of a narrative reconstruction of

our life and alludes to the image of a road of life. A moral map gives information about who I am, where I have come from and in which direction I am heading or want to head. I can ask myself if that is the life that I have always wanted to live. However, a moral map is not prefixed. It develops in the process of orientation and serves as a starting point for new experiences and considerations (Mandry 2009, p. 147/8). An essential role in this process plays the ability to articulate linguistically our strong evaluation even though this articulation will never entirely conform with the actual guiding function values have in our daily decisions.

The advantage of using Taylor's approach would be that it combines several aspects that so far turned out to be very relevant for the study of values namely the emergence of values through evaluations based on experience and rational reflection on values, but also emotional binding to values. It has to be seen, how it can be combined with the efforts of other work packages, especially WP2 and 3.

It has to be seen, in what way Taylor's concept of a moral map can be brought in a productive exchange with Joas' idea of the genesis of values. According to him values and value bindings arise "in experiences of self-formation and self-transcendence" (Joas 2000, p. 1). In the course of childhood and adolescence, individuals learn the values of their social surrounding, especially of their family, and become more and more able to reflect them critically (self-formation). This constitutes a value system that is not fixed but open to change. This change can occur in experiences of self-transcendence which allows individuals to cross their borders and to make new experiences that lead to new value bindings. Possible experiences of self-transcendence are collective ecstasy, prayers, especially intensive experiences with nature or sexuality but also with agony, fear or violence. Like Taylor, Joas highlights the crucial role of articulation of value experiences.

Both stress the importance of experiences for the formation of value bindings. This might prove to be the key to the question of contingent values. A combination of Joas' and Taylor's approaches might connect the aspects of value genesis, value binding and value reflection with some form of value mapping.

Values in society

Social Values

Especially when communicating between philosophy, theology and social sciences, we shall clarify the relationship between so called social and other values such as theoretical, aesthetical or moral values. With respect to this problem, we have to acknowledge that these "values" do not rank on the same level. While theoretical, aesthetical and moral values have a content-related reference point, social values are characterised by their relation to a specific social group. Theoretical values refer to the concept of truth, aesthetical values to the concept of beauty and moral values to a concept of the good or the right. According to Schlotter (2004), religious values have a particular position. They may refer to the concept of the holy but this does not add to the other values but includes them insofar as they are related to a transcendental reality (Schnädelbach 1983, p. 201, Schlotter 2004, 560/1). To some degree, this is comparable to social values, if we see people of a certain faith as a social group. They do not point to a highest value (beauty, truth, good) but include all values that are shared in a specific social group. They are valid in this group.

We suggest here an understanding of social values – in contrast to philosophical values – as not only contingent but also rather (*prima facie*) non-argumentative attributes of individuals and groups. This is not to say that social values are non-rational or even irrational, but the level of analysis simply is different from a philosophical discourse where argumentative validity ('Gültigkeit') of values is sought, despite their actual prevalence in society. One could

also say that philosophical values are treated by moral philosophy for normative ethics whereas social values are treated by the social sciences in some form of moral sociology. In that sense, the difference would lie in the methodological perspective.

With regard to social values, we might first ask what it means that societies understand themselves as a *community of values* the way European actors do (e.g. Barroso 2009, p.12). Mandry (2009, pp. 145/6) raises questions of what it means that a political community explicitly and publicly perceives itself as a community of values. For three reasons, an analysis of that issue has to consider common usages and attitudes of value concepts as well as more general ethical debates on values. (1) People belong to different social groups that have different value commitments. Identification with for example European values does not exist independently of these other value spheres. (2) There neither is a common nor a separate language and vocabulary for values in the value community Europe. Discussions on European values are influenced by existing conceptions of values. (3) One has to take into consideration that a debate on social values such as the European ones nevertheless has distinctive features as it takes place within distinct political cultures and institutions which emerged due to specific value commitments. It still makes a difference if one speaks as a private individual or an active citizen.

Collective moral maps are rooted in individual moral maps which always contain ideas of how social life and community, their aims, foundations and institutions should be constructed. As in pluralistic societies with diverging interests the final state of societies realising the concept of the good will be contested, communities will more likely focus on institutions and procedures which guarantee a fair process. In the end, it is possible that institutions such as the EU will become a value in themselves (Mandry 2009, p. 149/50, Mieth 2000).

Moral maps depict a narrative we tell about ourselves and refer to a history of collective experiences. In contrast to an individual map, however, this history always has alternative versions, is therefore inevitably contested and subject to value discourses. One of their foremost tasks is the linguistic articulation of our strong evaluations. As in the case of individual maps, this could be disappointed as there is always a gap between the guiding function of moral maps and the linguistic expression and reflection of strong evaluations. Avoiding linguistic expression of strong evaluations, however, leaves possibilities for reflection unexploited and reduces the chances of value communication and value development (Mandry 2009, p. 161).

European Values

With regard to a concept of European values, Joas points to a seeming paradox: Do Europeans share these values? Or do these values unite Europeans in a unique way? Some of the values mentioned above are clearly not to be limited to Europe itself; moreover their universality is often claimed. This could mean that Europeans are united by something that they do not want to keep solely for themselves. According to Joas (2005, p. 38), we do not have to speak of a paradox here. Values do not constitute exclusive systems by themselves but are believed, held and spread by people. As values are related to experiences and interpretations, it is possible to combine the particularity of individual experiences with the universality of values.

Therefore, if we ask for European values we do not only have to ask for value nouns but also for joint experiences (Mieth 2000; Joas 2005). In public, but also academic debates the impression is created that religion in general and Christianity in particular are the principle sources of European values. While religion played its part, it is by far not the sole source (Schnädelbach 2006). According to Mieth (2000), European values originate in:

- *Hellenistic-Roman antiquity* that spread beyond Europe and that represented environment for *Judaism* and *Christianity*;

- *Islamic influences* that also returned antique heritage in philosophy and gave the impulse for the creation of European universities;
- *Germanic influences* that are e.g. visible in the tensions between Germanic and Roman law;
- *Plurality of religious confessions* that led to a definition of basic rights that are independent of religious foundations;
- *European democracy movements* since 1789 that also resulted in tensions with ethnic, religious and other communities;
- Future political locations of Europe in times of *globalisation* and *technology-induced change*.

Joas/ Wiegandt (2005) also add the estimation of *inwardness* and of *ordinary life* and the experiences with *slavery* and with *totalitarian regimes*. Drawing a map of European values therefore means that we do not only locate topographical features on it and put the names of values on them but also that we have to bear in mind collectively made experiences, many of which have a complex *deep time* dimension.

If we regard European values as social values and understand social values as those values that are valid in a specific social group, in this case Europe, we have to face the question what Europe might be. An aspect which definitely needs consideration is the distinction between European values and the values of the European Union which started as a union of economies of post-World War II West-European democratic nation states. Can we suppose that the values of Europe and the EU are congruent? If not, which implications does this have for *Value Isobars*? And finally, European values do have a prescriptive function, if they are sought to have any: European values are more than the landscape of social values to be described. European values are understood at the same time as authoritative and binding for EU citizens and policies, even if the content of specific values is somewhat vague and open to different nuances and to ascertainment.

Values in Governance

WP1 advances the hypothesis that in EC and its S&T governance the shift to concepts of enabling and positive values is accompanied by a side-lining of ethics. The latter would here obviously be seen (and at least partly falsely so) as a restrictive and permanent trouble-maker. As ethics amongst other things is about analysing and criticising actions and institutions with regard to their moral rightness or goodness, its judgements can indeed restrict and limit the range of possible actions. Therefore, the reference to positive values seems much more attractive.

The working hypothesis gains further plausibility when we regard the governance approach itself. In the social sciences, this approach was used to deal with an ever growing complexity in political decision-making. Initially, it referred to forms of political guidance or steering. Then, the meaning of the concept of governance changed in two ways. In the first place, it “is used to indicate a new mode of governing that is distinct from hierarchical control mode, a more cooperative mode where state and non-state actors participate in mixed public-private networks” (Mayntz 2009, p. 13). A diverse set of actors with an interest in a policy matter are brought together to achieve an intended collective good. In the second place, it means a different mode of coordinating individual actors. Social orders emerge incidentally and independently of governments by the interaction of a multitude of individual actors.

In the academic literature, this shift from political steering to emergent processes is problematised for several reasons (cf. Streeck 2009, Offe 2008). For instance, it remains unclear which kind of agency is actually related to governance and how it can be distinguished from both state action in a classical sense and market processes. In our context,

the lack of normativity is of central importance. Former analytical models of political theory dealt with the conditions of an efficient steering by legitimised actors towards a predefined normative goal that also allowed evaluating the success of a social order retrospectively. However, if we regard social orders or public welfare as the result of emerging processes, we do neither need a government nor a predefined normative goal. Governance appears to be a comparatively soft substitute to state and government that somehow also leads to welfare and a good order. The proximity to market processes is obvious.

Against this background, it is very comprehensible that governance approaches refer to values rather than to ethics. Values make actions possible; one can relate to them without feeling an urgent need to do or leave anything. Ethics, on the contrary, might interfere with the help norms that could regulate or limit sectoral or policy-related interaction processes.

A project such as *Value Isobars* that explicitly refers to governance has to bear in mind the following tension: dealing with such a concept of values that does not include context-specific action-guiding provisions could weaken some ethically reflected but possibly more restrictive approaches. Notwithstanding, *Value Isobars* is heading in a different direction:


The goal of this project is to provide the blueprints for a value-based and value-informed new and flexible governance of the science-society relation in Europe. Furthermore, the study shall identify necessary research tasks in order to move from a generic understanding of value-based and value-informed governance to more specific mechanisms of governance that improve current practice.

This gives an answer to claims in the literature on governance. If politics has to cope with a complex situation that reduced the effectivity of hierarchical modes of governing, the success of policies does not only depend on voluntaristic networks but also on the citizens which have to understand, support, endure and participate consciously and deliberately (Offe 2008, p. 73). Offe emphasises the importance of good political communication and refers to two possible ways to promote this cooperative and understanding support by citizens: transparent and informative enlightenment on relevant policy facts and problems, but also the reference to norms and values as decisive motives and justifying foundation of political programs. The value maps *Value Isobars* is suggesting can greatly contribute to this good political communication. As governance also deals with the regulation, development and application of legal norms, standing rules, standards and codes, it might be useful in combining legal aspects and value landscapes in S&T policies (Mayntz 2009b, p. 10; for further considerations on governance and law cf. Quack 2010 and Socio-Economic Review 2010).

Conclusions

This report started off with the painting the “The Geographer” by Jan Vermeer. It was claimed that this picture raises several questions that are also central for the work of *Value Isobars*.

As mentioned earlier this picture shows the new and rising relevance of science in and for societies in early modernity. Scientists started to explore the real world in order to find scientific laws and regularities. This constitutes a new paradigm: it is the shift away from contemplation on the unfolding of a divine salvation history to a scientific analysis of reality. This shift also marks the end of metaphysics and the split of the ‘Good’ and the real world which in the 19th century led to the emergence of the concept of value. Science was not able any more to give moral orientation because it dealt with facticity, the empirical world. In this situation, values replaced the ‘Good’ to solve the resulting crisis of orientation.



The painting also depicts the role of S&T in society. While it shows how science contributes to expand human power over other regions, economies and even over the physical world, it does not problematise it. *Value Isobars*, however, deals more critically with the role of S&T in social contexts. While in the painting the role of S&T is seen very optimistic, Europeans today seem to be much more concerned about scientific innovations. Policy-makers have to respond to that and *Value Isobars* intends to find ways and means for them. The change in attitude to science might also be traced back to a change in value binding, what reminds us of the contingent nature of values. While asking for European social values, *Value Isobars* have to insist that validity claims of values have to be justified in ethical discourses in order to avoid simplifying relativist stances.

Finally, the painting raises the question of mapping: what is the map supposed to show – and what is its purpose for whom? When we put values on a map, is that descriptive or prescriptive? And in the case of prescription, are the values in some ways enforced? This leads us to the problematic issue of tyranny of values, an issue *Value Isobars* has to deal with carefully.

With the help of the painting “The Geographer”, it was possible to illustrate and summarise central aspects of WPI’s results. So far, WPI has analysed multiple meanings of values, especially European values, departing from official EU/EC communications. It follows the line of taking values not so much in a nominal sense of nouns but as attributes. The historical and socio-cultural multiplicity of values is taken for granted in contrast to conceptions of eternal and unchangeable values, but, however, this does not preclude to employ values as valid and binding – not for eternity but for a certain given time or at least for certain societies, states and/or supranational institutions.

It has already been mentioned, that for pragmatic reasons WPI already addressed the conceptual analysis of values, norms, preferences and attitudes which would have been due in the following deliverable. While the current work was necessarily restricted on philosophical and conceptual matters, the future work will look more closely on value questions in S&T and its governance in the EU.

For methodological reasons, it is suggested an understanding of social values – in contrast to philosophical values – as not only contingent but also rather non-argumentative attributes of individuals and groups. In the philosophical discourse argumentative validity (“Gültigkeit”) of values is sought, despite their actual prevalence in society. For *Value Isobars*, both perspectives – of moral philosophy for normative ethics as well as moral sociology for the landscape of values – are necessary, not least because of the prescriptive dimension of European values in the political and legal discourse. Our understanding of social values can be further broadened when we regard them with reference to and in the horizon of economic value theories. This is still to be done.

With regard to European values, they cannot be understood as being specific for Europe, but more effort is needed to address the question of whether a specific combination of values could be the source of some distinctiveness. Specific experiences Europeans made and that resulted in a value binding can be seen as leading to a solution to that puzzle. A further problem is the tension between the general notion of European and specific EC/EU values. The prescriptive dimension of European values especially with regard to S&T is a point to be further discussed and developed, not least in the course of the *Value Isobars* synthesis process.

The shift away from ethics and towards values can be safely understood as being part and parcel of new modes of governance – from binding and restricting rules to open “positive” tokens. However, this move does not come without a price and some problems: conflicts of values still have to be managed just like ethical dissents. The issues to be settled still retain their normative dimension. This is where more work is to be done in due course of the project: what can be done in the case of conflicting values and value trade-offs.

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